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Studies of executive institutions have largely dealt separately with national and international 
executive institutions (IEIs). This study unpacks and repacks four conflicting decision-making 
dynamics that unfolds at the frontier of IEIs – that is, at the institutional rim where national 
and international executive institutions meet, interact and collide. The empirical laboratory 
utilised is seconded national experts in the European Commission. The survey and interview 
data presented demonstrates that the decision-making behaviour of seconded national experts 
includes a mix of departmental (portfolio), epistemic (expert) and supranational behaviour. 
The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) that seconded national experts to the 
European Commission are highly conscious of their national background and that they 
represent domestic Trojan horses into the European Commission is severally challenged by 
this study. Arguably, the decision-making dynamics observed at the frontier of the 
Commission seem less affected by the member-state administrations and the international 
organisation in which the Commission is embedded, and strongly by organisational 
characteristics of the Commission itself.  
 
Introduction1 
Institutions are constantly rifted between unity and diversity, autonomy and dependence. This 
study argues that the European Commission (Commission) faces enduring conflicts between 
dependence on the member-state governments (Moravcsik 1998), supranational autonomy 
(Haas 1958), inter-DG conflicts and departmental rivalries (Cini 1996; Smith 1994), and 
professional concerns (Haas 1992). The purpose of this study is to illuminate to what extent 
and how the Commission balances these four dynamics and weaken the dependence on the 
member-state governments, leaving more space for supranational, departmental and epistemic 
dynamics. A crucial test of the transformative power of the Commission is the extent to which 
it manages to weaken intergovernmental behavioural dynamics among individual officials and 
induce them to supranational, departmental and epistemic behavioural dynamics. An under-
researched test-bed thereof is seconded national civil servants hired on short-term contracts 
and living at the frontier of the Commission (SNEs in Commission phraseology) (Rosenau 
1997). The frontier of the Commission incorporates both loosely organised networks and 
tightly organised webs of committees, agencies and SNEs. At the frontier of the Commission, 
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SNEs “sort and play out their many contradictions presently at work” (Rosenau 1997: 6; 
Trondal 2004a). The White Paper on Governance issued by the Commission (2001) assumes 
that the ‘exchange of staff and joint training between administrations at various levels would 
contribute to a better knowledge of each other’s policy objectives, working methods and 
instruments’ (European Commission 2001:13). Couched in more analytical terms, ‘the future 
organization of Europe involves a struggle for people’s minds, their identities and normative 
and causal beliefs’ (Olsen 2003:58). Fundamental transformations of political orders are 
caused not only by organisational reform but by shifting and reorganising behavioural 
dynamics within existing organisations (Holsti 2004).  
 
The study of international organisations and public administration are largely separate 
scholarly realms (e.g. Cox and Jacobson 1973; Maor and Lane 1999; March 1965; Simmons 
and Martin 2003). Moreover, studies of executive institutions have mostly dealt separately 
with national and international executive institutions (e.g. Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993; 
Nugent 1997; Reinalda and Verbeek 2004). National and international administrative orders 
are often portrayed as two separate systems with rather few intersections (Jachtenfuchs 1997: 
2). Moreover, beyond single-case studies there is a surprising dearth of theoretically informed 
empirical studies of the multiple internal decision-making dynamics of IEIs, including the 
Commission (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Gehring 2003; Gould and Kelman 1970; Johnston 
2003; Mouritzen 1990; Rochester 1986; Trondal 2004a). The Commission represents the most 
mature IEI world wide. The Commission also has a long history of integrating member-state 
administrations into the fabric of day-to-day Commission decision-making, contributing to a 
“de-bordering” (Kohler-Koch 2005:12) and the emergence of a “multi-level community 
administration” (Egeberg 2006) at the frontier of the Commission.  
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Member-state officials may be organisationally integrated into the frontier of IEIs in at least 
two ways. The first is by inviting member-state officials into permanent and temporary 
committees at the frontier of the core administration of IEIs (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal 
2003). The second is by appointing them outside regular recruitment procedures on short term 
secondment contracts into the core administration of IEIs (Trondal 2004a). The High Autority 
of 1952 was largely staffed by SNEs from the member-state governments, and the intention of 
its first President (Jean Monnet) was that the High Authority should rely on a seconded, 
flexible staff of top experts (Duchêne 1994: 240). However, SNEs have never dominated the 
Commission staff, but their number has steadily increased in the 1990s, particularly under the 
Delores Commission, to around 800-900 at present (CLENAD 2003; Trondal 2004a: 71). 
This study is the first systematic account of SNEs within the Commission. The empirical 
analysis benefits from a survey study (N = 71) and an interview study (N = 22) among SNEs 
to the Commission in 2004 and 2005.  
 
SNEs make decisions within the Commission DGs and Units almost on the same footing as 
permanent A-officials. The dependent variable of this study is the actual decision-making 
behaviour evoked by SNEs. Arguably, SNEs are rifted between four behavioural logics – 
intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and epistemic logics. SNEs are multiply 
embedded and are likely to evoke multiple behaviour logics. They may evoke a government 
representative (member-state) hat, a supranational (Commission) hat, a departmental 
(DG/Unit) hat, and/or an epistemic (professional) hat. Each SNE is likely to combine different 
mixes of this behavioural repertoire in different organisational situations. Whereas 
intergovernmental behavioural dynamics uphold territorial preferences, concerns, roles and 
loyalties among SNEs, the latter three dynamics severely weaken the extent to which SNEs 
represent their home government. Whereas supranational behaviour denote that SNEs have a 
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strong “cosmopolitan” Commission loyalty and act on mandates issued by the Commission 
politico-administrative leadership, departmental and epistemic behaviour transcend politico-
administrative control from the home government and the Commission leadership. 
Departmental behaviour is guided by administrative rules and procedures codified in the 
portfolios assigned to SNEs. Epistemic behaviour is guided by professional expertise and the 
educational background of the SNEs, loosely knit to fixed mandates from the Commission 
and the member-state leadership. These four behavioural logics may be interlinked 
differently, notably nested, cross-cutting, separate or fused (Herrmann and Brewer 2004:8; 
Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Risse 2004:251). 
 
An organisation theory perspective is suggested to account for the above four behavioural 
dynamics. Arguably, the behavioural repertoire evoked by SNEs is conditioned by the five 
following organisational factors: the organisational composition of the Commission, the 
organisational composition of domestic government systems, degrees of organisational 
compatibility across levels of governance, recruitment procedures of SNEs, and socialisation 
dynamics within the Commission. SNEs represent a crucial testing-ground for the 
independent impact of the Commission organisation because SNEs have multiple 
organisational belongings and because SNEs are strongly ‘pre-packed’ and pre-socialised 
before entering the Commission. SNEs are recruited to the Commission on short term 
contracts (maximum four years), paid by their home government, and the majority foresee a 
return to past positions in domestic ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts 
come to an end (CLENAD 2003). Hence, one expectation is that SNEs are reluctant to adopt 
supranational behaviour and more likely to evoke intergovernmental behaviour. However, 
while working for the Commission, SNEs transfer their primary organisational affiliation 
from the member-state administration to the Commission. According to the organisation 
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theory approach outlined primary organisations have stronger impact on incumbents than 
secondary organisations. Hence, SNEs might adopt a supranational behaviour due to their 
primary Commission affiliations. Moreover, SNEs are employed within sector ministries or 
agencies in their country of origin before entering the Commission and they are often enrolled 
within compatible Commission units. Arguably, the organisational embeddedness of SNEs in 
multiple compatible organisations specialised by purpose and process strengthen and uphold 
behavioural pattern that correspond to their portfolio (departmental logic) and their 
professional expertise (epistemic logic).  
 
The article proceeds as follows. The next section is sequenced in two steps. Step I outlines 
four decision-making dynamics. Step II outlines an organisational theory perspective that 
specifies the organisational contingencies under which each of these decision-making 
dynamics are evoked by SNEs. The next section presents a rich body of primary survey and 
interview data on SNEs in the Commission. These data demonstrate that the decision-making 
behaviour evoked by SNEs contain a mix of departmental, epistemic and supranational 
behaviour. The suspicion early voiced by Coombes (1970) that SNEs are highly conscious of 
their national background and that they represent domestic Trojan horses into the Commission 
is severally challenged by this study. SNEs at the frontier of the Commission seem less 
affected by their home government and the international organisation in which the 
Commission is embedded, but strongly by organisational characteristics of the Commission 
itself.  
 
Theorising decision-making at the frontier of the Commission 
Step I: Four ideal-typical decision-making dynamics. 
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The Commission, like most executive institutions, has an inbuilt tension between different 
governance dynamics, notably between intergovernmental, supranational, departmental and 
epistemic dynamics. Organisational stability within the Commission requires balancing these 
conflicting decision-making dynamics. Organisational transformation implies reorganising 
existing balances between dynamics by creating new temporary balances among them (Olsen 
2005). Behavioural transformation of SNEs implies a weakening of their intergovernmental 
behaviour and a strengthening of supranational, departmental and epistemic behaviour. 
 
The Commission may be pictured as constantly ripped between national interests, concerns, 
roles and loyalties and overarching community interests, concerns, roles and loyalties. This 
tension is not only challenged during large-scale intergovernmental conferences where the 
future constitutional fabric is negotiated (Moravcsik 1998), but also during day-to-day 
decision-making processes within the Commission (Haas 1958). The conflict between the 
concern for national preferences and community preferences is built into the role as a SNE. 
Despite SNEs have a formally declared loyalty solely towards the Commission and are 
supposed to act loyally towards the Commission, they are seconded from their home 
government. SNEs have only a temporary enrolment in the Commission, they remain paid by 
their home government during their stay at the Commission and the majority foresee a return 
to their home government after the secondment period. Still, SNEs have signed a contract 
formalising that “the SNE shall carry out his duties and shall behave solely with the interest of 
the Commission in mind” (European Commission 2004: Art. 7:1a). SNEs may thus activate a 
dual behavioural repertoire that includes (i) an intergovernmental behavioural pattern, guided 
by loyalty to their home government, preference for national interests, and intense contacts 
with their home base, and (ii) a supranational behavioural pattern coached by the top 
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leadership of the Commission, an internalised taken for granted loyalty towards the 
Commission, and a preference for “the common European good” (see Tables 1 and 2 below).   
 
The third and fourth decision-making dynamic that is built into the role as a SNE is that 
between portfolio interests (departmental behaviour) and professional interests (epistemic 
behaviour) (Radaelli 2001; Smith 2004). Commission officials, including SNEs, are recruited 
into DGs and units on issue-specific portfolios and are expected to fulfil the requirements of 
their assigned portfolio. The departmental dynamic predict SNEs to be “neutral, intelligent, 
generalist professionals who advice ministers” (Richards and Smith 2004: 779). SNEs are 
expected to evoke classical Weberian civil servant virtues, attach identity towards their 
Commission Unit and DG, and abide to administrative rules and procedures. This is the 
Westminster model that sees officials as neutral, permanent and loyal (Richards and Smith 
2004: 783). On the other hand, Commission officials are highly educated officials, recruited 
on the basis of past merits, and with a professional esteem attached to their educational 
background. The epistemic dynamics predict SNEs to enjoy a great deal of behavioural 
autonomy. They are assumed to prepare dossiers, argue, negotiate, and co-ordinate with 
colleagues on the basis of their professional competences and legitimate their authority on 
neutral competences (Haas 1992). Their decision-making behaviour is expected to be guided 
by considerations of scientific and professional correctness and the power of the better 
argument (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). This is the ‘Monnet official’ who is institutionally 
autonomous and a high-flying technocrat. 
 
Table 1 illustrates these four ideal-typical decision-making dynamics.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Table 2 suggests proxies of these decision-making dynamics.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
An organisational theory approach.      
This section argues that SNEs are likely to evoke departmental, epistemic and supranational 
behaviour due to the five following organisational factors: the organisational composition of 
the Commission, the organisational composition of domestic government systems, degrees of 
organisational compatibility across levels of governance, recruitment procedures of SNEs, 
and socialisation dynamics within the Commission.  
 
Organisational compositions 
This section argues that decision-making dynamics may be accounted for by considering the 
formal organisation of executive institutions (Holsti 2004). Arguably, the tensions between 
conflicting decision-making dynamics reflect the formal organisation of executive 
institutions. Put generally, behavioural contestation is activated by organisational structures 
that cross-cuts each other and challenge pre-existing decision-making dynamics. Accordingly, 
to Schattschneider (1975: 30) “organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for 
action”. Tensions and conflicts among multiple decision-making dynamics within IEIs are 
thus organisationally contingent. Formal organisations “are collections of structures, rules and 
standard operating procedures that have a partly autonomous role in political life” (March and 
Olsen 2005:4). Civil servants live with a constant overload of potential and inconsistent 
information that may be attended to at decision situations. Formal organisations guide the 
decision-making behaviour evoked by civil servants due to the computational limitations 
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among the latter (Simon 1957). Formal organisations are systematic devices for simplifying, 
routinising, directing and sequencing information towards particular decision situations 
(Schattschneider 1975: 58). The limited cognitive capacities among civil servants are 
systematised by vertical and horizontal specialisation of formal organisational charts. By 
specialising organisations each civil servant is assigned a formal role that specifies what 
problems, solutions and consequences s/he should de/emphasise (Egeberg 1999). 
Organisational specialisation lead to local rationalities and local and routinised learning cycles 
among the incumbents (Haas 2004: 587; Olsen 2005:12).  
 
Political orders are hybrids and inconsistent collections “of institutions that fit more or less 
into a coherent system” (Ansell 2004:234; March and Olsen 2005:8). Formal organisations 
contain sub-systems organised according to conflicting principles vis-à-vis the core-system. 
Organisations tend to accumulate conflicting organisational principles through horizontal and 
vertical specialisation (Olsen 2005). “The outcome of the game of politics depends of which, 
of a multitude of possible, conflicts gain the dominant position” (Schattschneider 1975: 60). 
When specialising formal organisations horizontally, two conventional principles have been 
suggested by Luther Gulick (1937). First, formal organisations may be specialised by the 
major purpose served – like research, health, food safety, etc. This principle tends to activate 
sectoral preferences and conflicts among incumbents along sectoral cleavages. Co-ordination 
and contact patterns tend to be channelled within departmental portfolios rather than between 
them. This mode of horizontal specialisation result in less than adequate horizontal co-
ordination across policy sectors and better co-ordination within policy sectors (Ansell 
2004:237). Arguably, organisation by major purpose served is likely to bias the decision-
making behaviour of SNEs towards the departmental logic and the epistemic logic. The 
Commission DG and unit structure is a prominent example of this horizontal principle of 
 12
specialisation (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). The Commission is a horizontally pillarised 
system of government specialised by purpose and with fairly weak organisational capabilities 
for horizontal co-ordination at the top through Presidential command (Dimitrakopoulos and 
Kassim 2005). Domestic central administrations are also often organised according to the 
principle of purpose (Peters 1995:158). Hence, we see a compatible organisational 
specialisation between the Commission and domestic government systems. Organisational 
compatibility by purpose serves to strengthen departmental and epistemic behaviour. 
 
A second principle of horizontal specialisation also present within the Commission is the 
principle of the major process utilised – like administration, legal service, personnel services, 
etc. (Gulick 1937). Within the Commission the Internal Services like Legal Service and DG 
for Translation illustrates the process principle. Moreover, domestic ministries are often 
organised by process, like ministries of administration, ministries of planning, etc. This 
horizontal principle encourages the horizontal integration of functional departments and the 
disintegration of the major purposes served. Arguably, organisation by major process is 
conducive to departmental and epistemic behaviour among SNEs. The Commission and 
domestic government systems are primarily organised horizontally by purpose, only 
secondary by function (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). 
 
Organisational compatibility 
Behavioural transformation requires some degree of organisational incompatibility across 
organisational borders (Egeberg 2004). Certainly, domestic officials entering the Commission 
building for the first time are likely to discover non-compatible working environments (March 
1994: 70). The novelty argument claims that people in new situations are likely to change 
exiting behavioural practices, notably towards a supranational logic (Hoohe 2005:8). One 
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example of organisational incompatibility is the rare occurrence of enrolment of SNEs into 
Commission portfolios that depart significantly from previous domestic portfolios. Another 
incompatible factor is the multi-national demography within Commission DGs, the fact that 
day-to-day discussions go in several languages, notably English and French, and the fact that 
the work place is located physically and temporally distant from the domestic government 
system (Egeberg 1999). The physical structure of the Commission building, the presence of 
blue flag with the golden stars as well as the member-state flags may also strengthen the 
perception of organisational incompatibility (Goodsell 1977). These variables of 
incompatibility may be conducive to the evocation of a supranational behavioural logic 
among SNEs. Moreover, the sheer fact that the Commission serve as their primary 
organisational affiliation may foster supranational behaviour among SNEs (Egeberg 2004).  
 
Studies of IEIs have underscored the fact that international civil servants have multiple 
institutional affiliations (e.g. Marcussen 2002). Notably, SNEs are formally employed by the 
Commission but paid by their home government. According to Art 7:1a in the new 
Commission rules for SNEs (2004), “the SNE shall carry out his duties and shall behave 
solely with the interest of the Commission in mind”. At the same time SNEs “shall remind in 
the service of their employer throughout the period of secondment and shall continue to be 
paid by their employer” (Art 1:2).2 Hence, despite being under Commission instructions, 
SNEs retain their organisational affiliation to their national ministry or agency. In short, SNEs 
have an ambiguous organisational embeddedness accompanying ambiguous behavioural 
expectations. Moreover, according to the new Commission rules for SNEs, SNEs do not have 
equal formal rights and obligations as permanent A-staff (European Commission 2004: Art 
6).3 Thus, SNEs are partly detached from their home government and partly from the 
Commission. On the basis of this double de-coupling, accompanying behavioural ambiguities, 
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one should expect that neither intergovernmental nor supranational behavioural patterns are 
strongly present among SNEs. SNEs are more likely to act in their capacity as portfolio 
specialists (departmental official) and/or as professional specialists (epistemic official). 
 
Recruitment procedures 
Decision-making dynamics within executive institutions are dependent on the recruitment 
procedures because different procedures for recruitment tend to bring in different people and 
keep them more or less autonomous vis-à-vis past constituencies (Mouritzen 1990: 39). 
Basically, recruitment may be based on a merit principle, as in most Western democracies, 
and on a quota principle or other systems of patronage or parachutage, as in the top echelon 
of the American civil service (Ingraham 1995: 9). Whereas the merit principle recruits 
permanent civil servants on the basis of competence, the quota principle typically recruits 
officials on more temporary contracts on the basis of, for example, political, sectoral or 
territorial loyalties (Bekke and van der Meer 2000: 281-282; Ingraham 1995: xix). It is the 
Director or Head of Unit in the relevant Commission DG who select relevant candidates for 
SNE contracts (EEA 2002:4). Hence, SNEs are not recruited in the open competition process 
to vacancies based on a written test, but in a more opaque process described by Stevens and 
Stevens (2001:87) as a “submarine approach” or as an entry in the back door to the 
Commission services. The vast majority of SNEs seem to be recruited on the initiative of 
Commission DGs as well as on personal initiatives by the SNEs (Statskontoret 2001:17: 34). 
The above factors are conducive to departmental and epistemic behaviour among SNEs. SNEs 
are not only recruited from sector ministries and agencies into compatible Commission 
portfolios, they anticipate going back to past positions after their Commission career. These 





The socialisation variable claims that behavioural practices may change due to individual 
experiences with particular institutions (Herrmann and Brewer 2004:14). The potential for 
socialisation to occur is assumed positively related to the duration and the intensity of 
interaction amongst the organisational members (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 150; Checkel 
2001: 26). This claim rests on socialisation theory that emphasises a positive relationship 
between the intensity of participation within a collective group and the extent to which 
members of this group take the world for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1991), become victims 
of ‘group think’ (Janis 1982), or develop particular perceptions of ‘community methods’ 
(Lewis 2000). Socialisation is s a dynamic process whereby individuals are induced into the 
norms and rules of a given community. By this process individuals come to internalise the 
norms, rules and interests of the community (Checkel 2005). Socialisation processes are uni-
directional in the sense that the socialisator educates, indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his 
norms and ideas to the socialisee. Hence, the length of stay at the Commission – or the 
individual seniority of SNEs – may foster a slow re-socialisation of SNEs towards 
supranational behaviour (Trondal 2004b). 
 
Data and method 
The observations reported in this study are based on a recent survey and interview study of 
SNEs in the Commission. The survey data results from a postal inquiry conducted in 2004 on 
a sample of 125 SNEs from different EU member-states as well as from the EEA countries 
Norway and Iceland. After three rounds of reminders the final sample totals 71, giving a 
response rate of 57 percent. This response rate is low compared to surveys within domestic 
central administrations, but higher than recent studies within the Commission (e.g. Hooghe 
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2005). The initial sample resulted from a short-list of SNEs provided by the EFTA Secretariat 
and by CLENAD. The final sample covers SNEs from 15 Commission DGs4 and from the EU 
member-countries Sweden (N=36), Denmark (N=3), Ireland (N=2), Germany (N=4) and 
France (N=1), and from the EEA countries Norway (N=20) and Iceland (N=2).5  
 
Due to the moderate number of respondents in the survey it is supplemented by in-depth 
interviews among a sub-sample of SNEs. 22 interviews were conducted in the winter 2004 - 
2005 on the basis of a semi-structured interview-guide. The questions posed to the 
interviewees partly supplements findings from the survey and partly add new observations of 
the internal life of SNEs. The next section is illustrated with direct quotations from 
transcribed interviews.   
 
The survey and interview data are based on a systematic selection procedure. This procedure 
does not allow for empirical generalisations. Still, “[s]mall Ns can yield big conclusions” 
(Andersen 2003:3 – original emphasis). One road to empirical generalisations is by reference 
to other empirical studies that support or reject our findings. In addition, our empirical 
observations are interpreted by reference to the organisation theory approach outlined above.    
 
Decision-making dynamics among SNEs 
This section measures the behavioural patterns of SNEs by considering their contact patterns 
(Table 3), their co-ordination patterns (Table 4), their emphasise on proposals, statements and 
arguments from different government institutions (Table 5), their agreement on concrete 
statements (Table 6) and their perceptions of other SNEs with respect to their representational 
roles (Table 7).  
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First, Table 3 measures four contact patterns evoked by SNEs.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 3 indicates that the contact patterns evoked by SNEs are ranked as follows: 
departmental contacts (mean=39 percent), epistemic contacts (mean=26 percent), 
supranational contacts (mean=8 percent), and intergovernmental contacts (mean=5 percent). 
First, departmental contacts are primarily directed within own Unit and DG. Fewer contacts 
are directed towards other DGs. According to one SNE, “within my Unit, there are waterproof 
borders between our dossiers” (interview – author’s translation). Inter-DG contacts are 
directed within dossiers rather than across dossiers (interviews). Hence, the horizontal 
specialisation of the Commission services, by purpose and process, is indeed conducive to 
departmental contact patterns among SNEs. Departmental contacts towards domestic 
government institutions are primarily directed towards ministries and agencies working within 
compatible Commission portfolios. Only rarely do SNEs contact domestic ministries or 
agencies in other policy areas. Hence, the organisational composition of the Commission and 
organisational compatibility across levels of government are conducive to a 
departmentalisation of SNEs’ contact patterns. Moreover, departmental contacts may also 
reflect the departmentalised recruitment practices of SNEs to the Commission. Our survey 
data reveals that the majority of the SNEs are recruited from domestic agencies and ministries 
that correspond closely to their current Commission portfolio.  
 
Secondly, the epistemic contacts evoked by SNEs are primarily directed towards experts 
inside and outside the Commission, towards universities and research institutions as well as 
towards Commission expert committees. Thirdly, the few supranational contacts reported are 
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mainly directed towards the Director of their DG and other international organisations. The 
interviews, however, reveal that SNEs have frequent contact with their Head of Unit. The 
Head of Unit is pictured as a gate-keeper inside the Commission hierarchy (interviews). 
According to one SNE, “I have had four Heads of Unit and the working procedures have 
changed each time” (interview – author’s translation). Finally, intergovernmental contacts 
tend to be directed towards the governments of other countries (14 percent) rather than 
towards the government of their country of origin (9 percent). Most of the SNEs interviewed 
agreed that their home ministry or agency seldom initiate contacts towards them (interview). 
According to one SNE, “I have very little contact with my ministry back home, almost 
nothing” (interview – author’s translation). The following phrase seems to cover the 
impression of most SNEs: “Out of sight, out of mind” (CLENAD 2003: 26; Statskontoret 
2001:17: 11).6 SNEs receive “very little feedback from capitals … and … in general they had 
expected to be in closer contact with their employer” (EFTA Secretariat 2000:2). These 
observations reflect the primacy of the Commission for SNEs and the de facto autonomy of 
SNEs vis-à-vis their home government.  
 
Table 4 reveals the mixed co-ordination patterns among SNEs.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The co-ordination patterns evoked by SNEs are ranked as follows: Departmental co-
ordination (mean=48 percent), supranational co-ordination (mean=29 percent), epistemic co-
ordination (mean=20 percent), and intergovernmental co-ordination (mean=6 percent). First, 
departmental co-ordination is strongly associated with the horizontal specialisation of the 
Commission services: co-ordination is stronger intra-departmentally than inter-
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departmentally. According to one SNE, “the administrative borders are distinct” (interview – 
author’s transnation). As predicted by our organisation theory approach, intra-DG co-
ordination tends to activate intra-DG conflicts. In the Commission these conflicts tend to 
follow organisational borders, vertically between Heads of Unit and subordinated officials, 
and only rarely between nationalities. Moreover, there seem to be fierce horizontal conflicts 
among A-staff and a low level of conflict between A-staff and SNEs. One reason for the latter 
observation is that A-staff compete for career advancement whereas SNEs often do not 
(interviews).  
 
SNEs co-ordinate more frequently within the Commission than externally towards domestic 
government institutions, reflecting the organisational composition of the Commission 
services. Moreover, SNEs tend do co-ordinate towards domestic government institutions 
working within compatible Commission portfolios (departmental co-ordination). 
Supranational co-ordination is mainly directed towards the Director of their DG, the Director 
General and the Commissioner (and Cabinet) of their DG. “The thing most SNEs comment on 
is how important the hierarchy in the Commission is” (CLENAD (2002: 43). Finally, 
intergovernmental co-ordination is rare and mainly conducted towards the government of 
other countries.   
 
Next, Table 5 illustrates how SNEs emphasise proposals, statements and arguments from 
domestic and EU institutions. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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The considerations emphasised by SNEs are ranked as follows: Departmental considerations 
(mean=58 percent), supranational considerations (mean=56 percent), epistemic considerations 
(mean=46 percent), and intergovernmental considerations (mean=9 percent). First, 
departmental considerations are primarily directed towards SNEs’ own Unit, own DG and 
other DGs. Hence, the inter-DG friction often referred to in the literature (e.g. Cini 1996: 153; 
Smith 2003:140) is observed among SNEs. According to one SNE, “I would say that the level 
of conflict between DGs is higher than between ministries at home” (interview – author’s 
translation). These observations clearly reveal that the horizontal specialisation of the 
Commission affects the priorities of SNEs. The departmental considerations reported also 
reveal that SNEs emphasise considerations from ministries and agencies from other countries 
that work within their current Commission portfolio. Supranational considerations are mainly 
directed towards the Director, the Director General and the Commissioner (and Cabinets) of 
their DG. Hence, SNEs have a priority profile that is strongly affected by the horizontal 
specialisation of DGs. Epistemic considerations are primarily directed towards individual 
experts inside and outside the Commission. Finally, intergovernmental considerations are 
weak and mainly directed towards the government of other countries than towards their home 
government. “We do not think according to nationality here. That is irrelevant. Nationality is 
only interesting over a cup of coffee” (interview – author’s translation). These findings 
support Shore’s (2000) anthropological study of the Commission. 
 
Table 6 presents how SNEs respond to concrete statements presented to them.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
By ranking the mean scores of each statement in of Table 6 the following rank-order appears: 
Supranational statements (mean=76 percent), departmental statements (mean=55 percent), 
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epistemic statements (mean=55 percent) and intergovernmental statements (mean=3 percent). 
First, supranational statements strongly reflect community preferences – that is, EU 
preferences, preferences for the member-states as a group and preferences of the DG 
leadership. According to Shore (2000: 152), SNEs “find it a wonderfully mind-expanding 
experience: most who come here want to stay after their secondment has finished. Like the 
agents temporaries ones they get one foot in the door they want to get the rest of their body 
through” (original emphasis). Hence, a socialisation dynamic towards supranationalism is 
indeed observed within the Commission, not outside it (Hooghe 2005). Secondly, the 
departmental statements reveal a high degree of intra-Unit and intra-DG co-ordination guided 
by established rules and procedures. Thirdly, the epistemic statements are mainly directed 
towards the professional expertise of SNEs. One fourth of the SNEs perceive that they have 
behavioural discretion at their disposal. Despite that Commission regulations officially state 
that “[n]ational experts are to work on the basis of firmly agreed job description” (European 
Commission 2002: 50 – original emphasis), only about 60 percent of SNEs argue that they 
have clear rules within their portfolios.  
 
The interviews in addition revealed a double organisational structure within the Commission. 
SNEs are guided by formal structures as well as informal structures (cf. Hooghe 2005:20). 
The following conditions seem to trigger a formalisation of decision-making processes among 
SNEs: decisions with budgetary implications, contractual issues, and routine decisions guided 
by standard operating procedures. Sequentially, the degree of formalisation tends to increase 
when dossiers reach the final vote inside their Unit and DG. Finally, junior SNEs seem to be 
guided by formal rules of procedures to a larger extent than senior A-staff (interviews).7 In 
sum the interviews paint a picture of the Commission as governed by formal written SNE-
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rules and informal codes of conduct within their Unit (interviews). These hierarchies live 
side-by-side and are mutually interdependent.  
 
Being embedded into multiple institutions simultaneously SNEs have several representational 
roles to play. The respondents were asked to evaluate the roles played by other SNEs. Table 7 
presents how SNEs perceive SNEs from other countries as regards the following four 
representational roles. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 confirms that SNEs perceive other SNEs to play mainly two representational roles – 
that as an ‘independent expert’ (epistemic role) and as a ‘DG/Unit representative’ 
(departmental role). Of less importance is the role as a ‘Commission representative’ 
(supranational role). The role as a ‘government representative’ (intergovernmental role) is not 
perceived important to SNEs. This observation challenges previous studies of SNEs that 
underscore the national loyalties of SNEs (Coombes 1970; Smith 1973; Smith 2001).  
 
Our data demonstrate that SNEs rarely feel a conflict of loyalty between different 
constituencies, concerns and role ideals. SNEs tend to manage multiple roles (cf. Herrmann 
and Brewer 2004:12). One SNE argue that, “my loyalty lies here in the Commission” 
(interview – author’s translation). At the same time many SNEs agree to the dictum, “I think 
in my heart I still represent my self” (interview – author’s translation). Hence, the assumed 
loyalty conflict between domestic and supranational constituencies is challenged by the 
observations presented in Tables 3 to 7. However, we observe an inbuilt conflict between the 
role as a departmental official (‘DG/Unit representative’), an epistemic official (‘Independent 
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expert’) and a supranational official (‘Commission representative’) among SNEs. We thus see 
a triangular role repertoire among SNEs. 
 
The SNEs were also asked if, before entering the Commission, they thought of EU co-
operation as mainly advantageous or disadvantageous. Prior to the secondment period, a large 
majority of the SNEs was positive to EU integration generally as well as within their 
portfolios. 52 percent of the SNEs did not change attitude in these regards during their 
Commission career. Among those that changed opinion during their secondment period, the 
net tendency is towards more favourable attitudes towards EU integration. Hence, working as 
SNE within the Commission contributes to only minor attitude changes. As predicted by the 
socialisation variable, however, we find a significant Pearson Correlation between seniority 
within the Commission and the tendency of SNEs changing attitude towards more pro-
integration in general (r = .33*) and within their own portfolio in particular (r = .32*). Hence, 
the longer SNEs have worked within the Commission the more favourable attitudes they 
develop towards EU co-operation. Some SNEs also have prior experiences from other 
international organisations, transgovernmental committees and boards, and from the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels. Moreover, some SNEs are pre-socialised through their 
educational background (e.g. the College of Europe, Brugge) and through a multi-national 
family background. Prior international experiences may be conducive to supranationalism. 
According to Page (1997: 60), SNEs generally have contacts with the Commission prior to 
entering it. Frequently, they “indicate a wish to spend three years in Brussels” (Page 1997: 
60). This indicates that supranational identities may reflect processes of pre-socialisation as 




The Commission is a crucial research laboratory for understanding what happens when 
conflicting decision-making dynamics collide at the frontier of IEIs. “Like other political 
systems, the EU is struggling to find a balance between the whole and the parts, between 
unity and disunity, co-ordination and autonomy” (Olsen 2004: 31). However, the Commission 
is also an under-researched laboratory for understanding to what extent, how and under what 
conditions different decision-making dynamics precede others. Located at the frontier of the 
Commission, SNEs represent a crucial laboratory for studying how organisational re-location 
contributes to change pre-existing behavioural practices.  
 
This study demonstrates that SNEs in the Commission evoke a triangular behavioural pattern 
that includes departmental, epistemic and supranational dynamics. The suspicion early voiced 
by Coombes (1970) that SNEs are highly conscious of their national background and that they 
represent domestic Trojan horses into the Commission is thus severally challenged by this 
study (see also Hooghe 2001: 115). Studies of the College of Commissioners and permanent 
Commission officials support this conclusion (Egeberg 1996 and 2004). Studies of permanent 
Commission officials also support our claim that full time officials with primary institutional 
affiliations within the Commission, recruited on the principle of merit, are more 
supranationally oriented than contracted officials with multiple and often ambiguous 
organisational allegiances, and recruited on less competitive and open procedures (Shore 
2000:131; Wodak 2004:107). Studies of other IEIs also suggest that intergovernmental 
behaviour is not a prevalent behavioural logic among IEI officials, even among IEIs within 
traditional intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations, Council of Ministers and 
the Council of Europe (Bartkowski 2005; Checkel 2005; MacMullan 2004: 418; Trondal, 
Marcussen and Veggeland 2005). For example, supranational dynamics are observed within 
COREPER (Lewis 2000), departmental dynamics are observed within the OECD Secretariat 
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(Trondal, Marcussen and Veggeland 2005), and epistemic dynamics are demonstrated within 
the Secretariat of the World Health Organisation (Bartkowski 2005). Henceforth, the 
dominating decision-making dynamics within IEIs seem less affected by the member-state 
administrations and the international organisation in which IEIs are embedded, and stronger 
by the organisational characteristics of the IEIs themselves. The study of SNEs at the frontier 






















Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Four ideal-typical decision-making dynamics 
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Table 3: Percent of SNEs who have the following contact patterns.1)   
Four ideal-typical contact patterns:  
1) Intergovernmental contacts: 
- with the government of my country of origin 
- with domestic ministries in my country of origin working within other policy    
areas than my current Commission portfolio 
- with domestic agencies in my country of origin working within other policy 
areas than my current Commission portfolio 
- with the governments of other countries 
- with ministries or agencies of other countries working within other policy 










2) Supranational contacts: 
- with the Director General of my DG 
- with the Director of my DG 
- with the Commissioner (and Cabinet) of my DG 
- with Commissioners of other DGs 
- with the Council of Ministers 
- with the European Parliament 









3) Departmental contacts: 
- with colleagues within my Unit 
- with colleagues within other Units in my DG 
- with colleagues in other DGs  
- with domestic ministries in my country of origin working within my current 
Commission portfolio 
- with domestic agencies in my country of origin working within my current 
Commission portfolio 












4) Epistemic contacts: 
- with individuals inside the Commission whom I respect for their expertise 
- with individuals outside the Commission whom I respect for their expertise 
- with the Commission expert committees 
- with industry 







Mean N 100 % 
(67) 
1) The variables listed include officials having contacts fairly often, or very often with the respective institutions. 
This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very often (value 1), fairly often (value 2), both/and 







Table 4: Percent of SNEs who co-ordinate with the following institutions.1) 
Four ideal-typical patterns of co-ordination:  
1) Intergovernmental co-ordination: 
- with the government of my country of origin 
- with ministries or agencies in my country of origin working within other 
policy areas than my current Commission portfolio 
- with the government of other countries 
- with ministries or agencies in other countries working within other policy 








2) Supranational co-ordination: 
- with the Director General of my DG 
- with the Director of my DG 
- with the Commissioner (and Cabinet) of my DG 
- with Commissioners of other DGs 
- with the Council of Ministers 
- with the European Parliament 









3)  Departmental co-ordination: 
- within own Unit 
- with other Units within my DG 
- with other DGs 
- with ministries or agencies in my country of origin working within my 
current Commission portfolio 










4)  Epistemic co-ordination: 
- with industry 
 
20 % 
Mean N 100 % 
(57) 
1) The variables listed include officials who co-ordinate fairly much or very much with the institutions 
mentioned in the Table. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much (value 1), fairly 











Table 5: Percent of SNEs who emphasise proposals, statements and arguments from the 
following institutions.1)  
Four ideal-typical patterns of consideration:  
1) Intergovernmental considerations: 
-    from the government of my country of origin 
-    from domestic ministries or agencies in my country of origin working   
within other policy areas than my current Commission portfolio 
- from the government of other countries 
- from ministries or agencies in other countries working within other policy 








2) Supranational considerations: 
- from the Director General of my DG 
- from the Director of my DG 
- from the Commissioner (and the Cabinet) of my DG 
- from Commissioners of other DGs 
- from the Council of Ministers 
- from the European Parliament 









3) Departmental considerations: 
- from my own Unit 
- from other Units within my DG 
- from other DGs  
- from domestic ministries or agencies in my country of origin working within 
my current Commission portfolio 
- from domestic ministries or agencies in other countries working within my 









4)  Epistemic considerations: 
- from individuals inside the Commission whom I respect for their expertise 
- from individuals outside the Commission whom I respect for their expertise 
- from Commission expert committees 
- from industry 







Mean N:  100 % 
(62) 
1) The variables listed include officials emphasising proposals, statements and arguments from the respective 
institutions fairly much, or very much. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much 








Table 6: Percent of SNEs who strongly agree on the following statements.1)  
Four ideal-typical behavioural statements:  
1) Intergovernmental statements: 
- “I put forwards proposals I think is in the best interests of my country” 
 
3 % 
2) Supranational statements: 
- “My proposals are co-ordinated with the leadership of my DG” 
- “I put forward proposals I think is in the best interest of the member-states 
as group” 






3) Departmental statements: 
- “My proposals are co-ordinated with all relevant Units and DGs of the 
Commission” 
- “My proposals are primarily co-ordinated within my Unit” 
- “My proposals are primarily co-ordinated within my DG” 
- “My proposals are often based on existing Commission rules and 
procedures” 









4) Epistemic statements: 
- “I put forward proposals I think is best on the basis of my professional 
expertise” 





Mean N 100 % 
(60) 
1) The variables listed included officials who strongly agree on the statements mentioned. The original 
variable consisted of the following three-point scale: strongly agree (value 1), both/and (value 2), and 














Table 7: SNEs’ perception of the representational roles evoked by other SNEs. 
 Strongly agree Both/and Strongly disagree Total 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This study is financially supported by “CONNEX – Connecting Excellence on Governance in Europe”. A 
previous draft was presented at the CONNEX workshop “Institutional Dynamics and the Transformation of 
European politics”, 27-28 May 2005, Oslo. Thanks to the participants at this workshop for stimulating 
comments, to Lene Jeppersen Ceeberg for research assistance and to Torbjörn Larsson for research 
collaboration.  
2 Additional financial allowances are granted by the Commission. They include a daily allowance and either 
removals costs or an extra monthly allowance. 
3 According to the old rules for SNEs, ”national experts have the same rights and obligations as EU officials…” 
(European Commission 2002:50). In the new Commission rules on SNEs Art 6 grants SNEs a B-status compared 
 41
                                                                                                                                                        
to ordinary Commission officials. For example, Art. 6:2 states that ”[a] SNE shall take part in missions or 
external meetings only if accompanying a Commission official or temporary agent, or acting alone as an 
observer or for information purposes”.  
4 The DGs covered by the study are: DG Education and Culture, DG Employment and Social Affairs, DG 
Enterprise, DG Environment, DG Energy and Transport, Eurostat, DG Fisheries, DG Health and Consumer 
Affairs, DG Information Society, DG Research, DG Taxation and Customs Union, DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs, DG Trade, DG Competition, and DG Development DG.  
5 Three respondents did not report their country of origin.  
6 Similar observations are done in the Council of Europe (MacMullen 2004: 418). 
7 The SNEs were also asked if they put forward proposals on the basis of their political convictions. 86 percent 
of the SNEs strongly disagreed on this point, illustrating the low degree of party political consideration among 
SNEs in the Commission. Egeberg (2004) also observes that Commissioners emphasise their ‘party role’ 
significantly lower than their ‘Commission role’, their ‘portfolio role’ and their ‘country role’.  
 
